Nine people died and 32 were injured after seized explosives linked to the Red Fort terror module accidentally detonated at Nowgam police station in Srinagar.
Brajesh Mishra
Nine people were killed and 32 injured when seized explosives linked to the Faridabad terror module detonated inside the Nowgam Police Station in Srinagar late Friday night. The blast occurred during routine forensic sampling of 360 kg of highly unstable explosive materials recovered just days earlier—materials tied to the Red Fort blast that killed 13 in Delhi.
The incident has ignited scrutiny over explosive-handling procedures and coordination gaps between agencies managing one of India’s most complex terror investigations.
The Nowgam blast sits at the end of a fast-moving, multi-state investigation into a Jaish-e-Mohammed–linked “white-collar terror module” operating across Kashmir, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh.
The probe began in late October, when police tracked down JeM posters found in Srinagar’s Bunpora area. Interrogations led to the arrest of Maulvi Irfan Ahmad (link: Maulvi Irfan Ahmad), an imam who allegedly radicalised medical students and doctors through encrypted apps like Threema and ProtonMail.
By early November, investigators had unmasked a 22-member terror network of doctors and engineers centered in Al Falah University, Faridabad. A series of raids between November 9–10 uncovered 2,900 kg of explosive materials, rifles, timers, and bomb-making equipment—part of a planned December 6 coordinated attack across Delhi.
On November 10, a member of the same network detonated a car bomb near Red Fort Metro Station, killing 13. The explosives seized afterward were transported to Srinagar for forensic analysis, placing the Nowgam station at the center of the investigation.
Nalin Prabhat (link: Nalin Prabhat) — DGP, Jammu & Kashmir
Oversaw the investigative chain and declared the Nowgam explosion “accidental.” His statements are now key to understanding whether procedures were adequate.
Quote: “Despite extreme caution by FSL team, an accidental explosion occurred at 11:20 PM. Any other speculation is unnecessary.”
Maulvi Irfan Ahmad — Imam, alleged module coordinator (link: Irfan Ahmad)
Considered the ideological and logistical hub of the network, connecting Kashmir-based recruits to Pakistan-linked handlers via encrypted platforms.
Dr. Muzammil Ahmad Ganaie — Doctor, Al Falah University (link: Muzammil Ahmad Ganaie)
Alleged head of the Faridabad cell. His rented residence yielded 358 kg of ammonium nitrate. Interrogators say Room 13 inside the campus served as the “command post” for planning mass-casualty attacks.
Most coverage frames the blast as a tragic accident during a high-stakes investigation.
While that remains true, the deeper story lies elsewhere.
While most reports focus on the explosion itself, the deeper story is the systemic vulnerability exposed by storing and sampling unstable explosives inside an active police station.
A 360-kg consignment of ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate, sulphur, and improvised chemicals—part of the largest terror haul in recent years—was kept in an open compound rather than a controlled detonation facility. Forensic experts and revenue officials were working shoulder-to-shoulder, and at least one civilian was inside the contamination zone.
This isn’t only an accident. It’s a window into capacity constraints inside India’s counter-terrorism infrastructure.
The explosion has direct consequences for counter-terror operations, forensic capacity, and protocols governing inter-state evidence transport.
It erases an experienced team of investigators and FSL specialists at a time when agencies must quickly process thousands of kilograms of seized explosives. The incident also raises fresh questions for J&K Police, NIA, and the Ministry of Home Affairs:
Were storage protocols outdated? Was FSL equipped to handle volatile mixtures? Should seized explosives from terror modules be examined in urban police campuses at all?
Beyond immediate casualties, the event highlights a broader risk—India still lacks a unified, modernized hazardous-materials chain of custody, even as terror modules shift toward chemically sophisticated, professionally trained operatives.
If India’s counter-terror investigations must now process industrial-scale explosives and university-educated operatives, can its forensic and police infrastructure keep pace with the sophistication of the threats it is trying to prevent?
Exclusive Content
Sign up for the Daily newsletter to get your biggest stories, handpicked for you each day.
Trending Now! in last 24hrs
