New Delhi–born scholar S. Paul Kapur is sworn in as America’s South Asia chief—bringing a hard Pakistan thesis and a louder U.S.–India tilt.
Sseema Giill
The State Department’s South Asia desk has a new boss—and a very specific theory. On October 23 (ET), Dr. S. Paul Kapur was sworn in as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, the bureau that stewards relations with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and a dozen other nations. The bureau announced it with a simple post on X: “Welcome to @State_SCA, Assistant Secretary Paul Kapur! This morning Dr. Kapur was officially sworn in…”.
Kapur, a New Delhi–born scholar long associated with the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and Stanford’s Hoover Institution, succeeds Donald Lu, whose term ended in January 2025. State’s bio page is live; Lu’s departure was noted earlier this year.
Nine months without a confirmed chief left Washington’s South Asia policy in holding pattern. Kapur’s confirmation—reported October 7—plugs that gap and, more importantly, installs a strategist whose published view is unambiguous: Pakistan has used Islamist militancy as a deliberate instrument of statecraft, not merely a by-product of weakness. Expect a harder line toward Islamabad and accelerated convergence with New Delhi.
Kapur’s academic calling card is his 2016 book Jihad as Grand Strategy (Oxford), which argues Pakistan has long leveraged militant proxies under a nuclear umbrella that limits Indian retaliation. That thesis, once debated in journals, now has a policymaker’s pen behind it.
His résumé maps cleanly onto the moment: professor at the Naval Postgraduate School; visiting fellow at Hoover; service on State’s Policy Planning Staff during 2020–21. The State Department biography confirms the arc.
Pakistan policy gets conditional. Expect reviews of security assistance and sharper linkage to action against designated groups, shifting cooperation from “partnering” to pressure. Multiple mainstream reports frame Kapur’s appointment as signaling a tougher stance.
India policy gets louder. With Washington’s China strategy leaning ever more on New Delhi, Kapur is likely to prioritize defense ties, tech corridors, and diplomatic coordination with India—continuing a years-long trend.
Region watches for tells. Kabul, Dhaka, Colombo and Kathmandu will read the first tranche of statements for whether Kashmir is de-emphasized, whether Taliban engagement bypasses Pakistani “facilitation,” and how hard the bureau leans on counter-terror finance. Early coverage in Indian outlets underscores the symbolic and strategic weight of Kapur’s elevation.
The useful question is harder: What happens when a theory about Pakistan’s use of proxies becomes the operating premise of U.S. policy? If Kapur is right, a firmer line reduces moral hazard and stabilizes deterrence. If he’s wrong, pressure accelerates Islamabad’s tilt to Beijing and narrows U.S. leverage across the subcontinent. Either path will be measurable in aid conditionality, CT designations, and India-U.S. defense integration over the next 6–12 months.
Any immediate guidance on security assistance to Pakistan; 2) the language Kapur uses on Kashmir and CT cooperation; 3) early travel and call sheets—Delhi first or a broader regional swing?
1) Who is S. Paul Kapur?
A New Delhi–born American scholar of South Asian security and nuclear strategy. He’s taught at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, was a visiting fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, and served on State’s Policy Planning Staff.
2) What job did he just take?
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs—the top U.S. diplomat overseeing India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the five Central Asian republics.
3) When was he sworn in?
The bureau announced the swearing-in on Oct 23, 2025 (U.S. ET). We’re publishing for Indian readers on Oct 24, 2025 (IST).
4) Why is this appointment a big deal?
Because Kapur’s core thesis—Pakistan uses jihadist proxies as a deliberate instrument of state strategy—could now guide U.S. policy levers: security assistance, terrorism designations, diplomatic conditionality, and India-U.S. defense integration.
5) How might U.S. policy toward Pakistan change?
Expect tighter conditions on aid and arms support, more explicit demands on anti-terror action, and less patience for “good militant/bad militant” distinctions. Counterpoint: over-pressure could accelerate Pakistan’s pivot to China and reduce U.S. access.
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