The Union government plans a major legislative push to create an explicit constitutional and statutory framework for removing a Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and ministers who remain under arrest or detention for 30 consecutive days in cases involving serious criminal charges—defined as offenses carrying a minimum sentence of five years. Union Home Minister Amit Shah is slated to introduce three bills to this effect in the Lok Sabha, with a motion to refer them to a joint parliamentary committee for scrutiny during the current session.
According to outlines provided to members of Parliament and media reports, the reform would fill a long-discussed gap: while the Representation of the People Act, 1951 disqualifies legislators on conviction for offenses with sentences of two years or more, there is no clear, uniform rule addressing removal from executive office during pre-trial arrest or detention. The proposed framework seeks to separate the question of legislative membership from eligibility to continue in executive positions when serious allegations lead to prolonged custody.
At the heart of the package is the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, which would amend Articles 75 (Union Council of Ministers), 164 (State Councils of Ministers), and 239AA (National Capital Territory of Delhi) to codify removal triggers and authorities. Complementary amendments to the Government of Union Territories Act and the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act would align Union Territories and J&K with the new standard, ensuring consistency across jurisdictions.
Provisions described in reports and explanatory notes indicate the following mechanisms:
- Prime Minister and Union Ministers: If arrested and detained for 30 consecutive days on a qualifying offense, the PM must resign by the 31st day; failing which, removal would follow, with the President acting on the Prime Minister’s advice for ministers or applying the rule for the PM as stipulated in the amendment.
- Chief Ministers and State Ministers: A Chief Minister detained for 30 straight days would be removed by the Governor; state ministers would be removed by the Chief Minister under the same 31st-day rule, creating symmetric accountability at the state level.
- Union Territories and NCT of Delhi: For UTs, including Delhi under Article 239AA, aligned provisions would empower the Lieutenant Governor to remove a detained Chief Minister under the same conditions, bringing UT executives under the uniform framework.
Some versions of the explanatory material also note reappointment possibilities after release from custody or acquittal, suggesting that the removal is not an automatic bar to future office but a status-based safeguard during periods of extended detention. The government’s statement of objects frames the move as necessary to uphold constitutional morality and public trust, averting governance paralysis or undue influence by officeholders under grave legal shadow.
Politically, the proposals have triggered immediate debate. Supporters call the 30-day custody rule a long-overdue measure to strengthen accountability and prevent scenarios where executive authority is exercised from jail for extended periods, citing recent controversies in which leaders continued in office during prolonged custody. They argue that the bright-line rule enhances credibility of governance and reduces ambiguity that has often fueled political brinkmanship and litigation.
Opposition parties have condemned the initiative as overreach with high potential for misuse. Critics warn that central investigative powers could be weaponized to arrest opposition leaders, trigger the 30-day clock, and destabilize non-ruling-party governments without a court verdict, effectively converting pre-trial detention into a political disqualifier. Senior opposition figures have vowed to resist the bills both procedurally and, if necessary, in court, calling them “draconian” and a step toward undermining federal balance.
The constitutional dimension is complex. Amending Articles 75 and 164 directly touches the architecture of executive responsibility at the Union and state levels. Proponents will emphasize that the trigger is objective—custody for 30 consecutive days on offenses with minimum five-year sentences—and that due process is preserved because criminal adjudication continues independently; removal does not equal conviction. Opponents will contend that pre-trial detention is not a reliable proxy for guilt and can reflect investigatory discretion, bail conditions, or procedural delays, making it an unstable foundation for automatic removal.
Operationally, the 30-day metric creates administrative clarity but raises implementation questions. For example:
- What constitutes “consecutive days” across transfers between investigative custody and judicial custody?
- How are multiple FIRs or cases consolidated for counting purposes?
- Do remand extensions paused by court holidays affect the tally?
- What is the precise time and manner of resignation or removal on the 31st day, and which constitutional authorities must be notified?
These details are likely to be elaborated in the bill text and subsequent rules, and may be refined during committee review.
Federal implications also loom large. The Governor’s role in removing a Chief Minister could become a flashpoint in states with adversarial Centre-state politics. Courts have repeatedly adjudicated boundaries of gubernatorial discretion in matters like government formation and floor tests; the new removal power, if enacted, would add a fresh domain requiring careful procedural safeguards to avoid constitutional crises. Clear timelines and automaticity with minimal discretionary levers would be crucial to withstand legal scrutiny and preserve legitimacy.
For the National Capital Territory of Delhi, any amendment affecting Article 239AA intersects with an already sensitive balance between the elected government and the Lieutenant Governor. The proposed alignment here will likely attract focused debate, especially in light of previous Supreme Court rulings on administrative control and the demarcation of powers.
From a governance standpoint, the package addresses a recurrent practical dilemma: how to ensure continuity and integrity of executive decision-making when a head of government or minister is unavailable due to incarceration. Automatic removal after 30 days provides predictability and allows for prompt appointment of successors, reducing uncertainty in administration, budgetary decisions, and emergency response. The reappointment clause post-release, if retained in the final text, offers a path back while maintaining the integrity threshold during detention.
Public reaction is expected to track partisan lines in the near term, but the longer-term test will be in application. Transparent, uniform enforcement—free from selective targeting—would be essential to build trust. Independent oversight, frequent parliamentary review, and judicial recourse against arbitrary arrests could act as counterweights to the risk of politicization.
The legislative process ahead is likely to be contentious. Media reports indicate that the bills will first be introduced and then sent to a joint parliamentary committee, where experts, former judges, and stakeholders could be called to depose, and textual refinements can be made before a final vote. Given the constitutional amendment, passage would require special majorities in both Houses and ratification by at least half the states for provisions touching the federal structure, adding to the hurdles and ensuring a robust deliberative process.
If enacted substantially as outlined, the reform would mark a significant evolution in India’s constitutional practice: separating the right to contest and hold legislative office from the privilege of exercising executive authority during periods of extended custody for serious alleged crimes. The government’s case rests on strengthening constitutional morality and administrative continuity; the opposition’s case warns against pre-conviction penalties and central overreach. The committee stage and, potentially, judicial review will decide how this balance is ultimately struck.
For citizens and institutions, the practical takeaway is straightforward: the bills seek to create a bright-line 30-day custody rule that triggers removal from executive office for the PM, CMs, and ministers, subject to defined procedures and authorities, while leaving room for reappointment once custody ends or legal clarity improves. The outcome of the parliamentary process will determine whether this becomes a new constitutional norm or a catalyst for rethinking the relationship between criminal process and executive power in India’s democracy.
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